Legal Articles, Divorce & Family Law

In a post-judgment divorce action earlier this year, involving a stipulation agreement, the Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport found a father in contempt of a court order that required him to provide health insurance coverage for his minor child, or at least pay a portion of her premium.

Every lawyer who handles divorce cases recognizes that grimace.  We often see the reaction from other lawyers and people in everyday conversation when they hear we litigate divorces and custody matters.  Most often, the grimace is followed by a verbal recognition of how “draining” or “difficult” the business can be. Invariably, that reference relates not merely to the two individuals who have decided that their marriage is no longer viable; rather, the fallout often squarely lands on the children caught in the midst of a custody battle during a divorce – or sometimes, in a residential relocation petition by one parent in the years after a divorce. Where young children are involved, divorce lawyers regrettably see a frequency of parental alienation by one party or the other, an active or passive attempt by a divorce litigant to cause the children of that union to align against his or her soon-to-be ex-spouse.

In a post judgment divorce case, the Connecticut Appellate Court validated the use of ongoing discovery to obtain documentation necessary to perform an independent review of an alimony payor’s income. In this particular case, the parties obtained an uncontested divorce in 2007. Pursuant to their separation agreement, the husband was required to pay the wife alimony in accordance with designated percentages of his gross income.

In a decision, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed a trial court order requiring a father to pay post secondary educational expenses even though no finding had been made that the parties would have provided support for college expenses had the family remained intact.  The parties in this action obtained an uncontested divorce in 2007.  Pursuant to the terms of their separation agreement, the court retained jurisdiction “to allocate between the parties any and all college tuition and expenses incurred on behalf of the minor child…”

The Connecticut Supreme Court held that child support orders may be modified upon a change in primary residence, even where a separation agreement contains language expressly precluding such modification.  In this particular case, the parties are the parents of two minor children.  Following their divorce, the children lived with the mother on a primary basis.

In a post-judgment divorce action, the Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford denied a husband’s motion seeking modification of his child support obligation on multiple grounds. When a parent seeks to modify the amount of his child support payments, he or she must show the existence of a substantial change in circumstances that would render it unfair to hold both parties to the terms of the previous order. Whether parental alienation constitutes such a change was at issue in this case.

The Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford considered a case of first impression regarding whether third parties are bound to automatic orders pursuant to a dissolution action. In this case, the plaintiff’s former wife commenced a dissolution action, and automatic orders were attached to the complaint, including one which prohibits the encumbrance of property without consent of the other party or by judicial order. However, in direct violation of the orders, the plaintiff’s wife executed and delivered two mortgages on the marital home to the defendant. Four years later, the plaintiff entered into a written contract to sell the home. When the plaintiff demanded that the defendant release the mortgages, the defendant refused and this lawsuit commenced.

As the following case illustrates, a court may terminate parental rights despite significant progress toward personal rehabilitation. DCF first became involved in the termination of parental rights when the mother was admitted to a rehab program for alcohol abuse.  The hospital filed a neglect report with the Department after the ambulance crew reported unsanitary conditions within the mother’s home.  DCF subsequently removed one of the children because it believed the home was physically unsafe.  Following a subsequent incident in which the mother relapsed and was admitted to a second rehab program, the Department obtained an order of temporary custody, and the child was placed in a foster home.

In the past, custody disputes across the country have increasingly referred to the concept of parental alienation syndrome, which has been defined by one court as “a systematic programmed alienation of a child from one parent brought upon by the other parent.” Ellis v. Ellis, 952 So. 2d 982, 992; see also A.C.H. v. F.R.S., 247 S.W.3d 921, 926 n.4 (Mo. App. 2008) (parental alienation syndrome is where parent attempts to emotionally alienate child from absent parent).

In a post-judgment divorce action involving contemptuous conduct, the Appellate Court of Connecticut considered a defendant’s numerous claims that the trial court erred in its child custody determination. The plaintiff father and defendant mother were married for fourteen years and had one child together. Pursuant to a comprehensive separation agreement, the parents shared joint legal custody, while the mother had primary physical custody of the minor child.