Gadsden Divorce & Family Law Lawyer | Alabama

Top Local Lawyers
Clark Hall
Clark Hall, Attorney At Law
Accident & Injury, Criminal, Divorce & Family Law, Employment, Estate
750 Forrest Ave
Gadsden, AL 35901
Donald R. Rhea
Rhea, Boyd & Rhea
Accident & Injury, Workers' Compensation, Social Security -- Disability, Veterans' Affairs, Estate
930 Forrest Ave
Gadsden, AL 35901
C. Blake West
C. Blake West, Estate Planning Attorney
Estate, Estate Planning, Wills & Probate, Trusts,
1701 Main Ave SW Suite 5
Cullman, AL 35055
Robert K. Finnell
The Finnell Firm
Accident & Injury, Car Accident, Personal Injury, Wrongful Death, Motorcycle Accident
One West Fourth Avenue Suite 200
Rome, GA 30162
William Robert Pringle
William R. Pringle, LLC
Accident & Injury, Personal Injury, Wrongful Death, Car Accident, Slip & Fall Accident
3625 1St Avenue South
Birmingham, AL 35222
Derek Simms
Simms & Associates
Accident & Injury, Personal Injury, Traffic, Criminal, DUI-DWI
608 37th St. S.
Birmingham, AL 35222
Ted Colquett
CLAW Colquett Law, LLC
Accident & Injury, Insurance, Wrongful Death, Insurance Malpractice, Personal Injury
Post Office Box 59834
Birmingham, AL 35295
Michael Paul Russ
Premier Law Firm, LLC
Criminal, Divorce & Family Law, Accident & Injury,
P.O. Box 55002 P.O. Box 55002
Birmingham, AL 35255
Joshua Jon Wright
Hollis, Wright & Clay, P.C.
Accident & Injury, Civil Rights, Products Liability, Personal Injury, Car Accident
2201 Morris Ave
Birmingham, AL 35203
About John
Upon becoming an attorney in Alabama, I worked mostly on personal injury cases. This included things such as medical malpractice, products liability, motor vehicle wrecks, premises liability, workman's compensation, and negligence. In recent years, our aging population throughout Alabama has focused my attention on family & estate law, including divorces, child custody, visitation and support, adoptions, formations of estates and estate planning, wills and trusts, immigration, and criminal cases, although it hasn't narrowed by attention to each facet of the law, nor does it mean I only work in those areas of law.
I grew up in a family of six children on Lookout Mountain just outside of Gadsden, and worked in my father's tire recapping business in Downtown Gadsden where hard work and determination are skills that were instilled early and have been used often in my life. I became a lawyer because I wanted to help people, and it seemed like a much better way to make a living than recapping tires in the sweltering Alabama heat. After having been in practice for over a quarter century, I have no regrets about becoming a lawyer, although I am not so sure that practicing law is an easier way to make a living.
If you have any questions about a potential legal case and would like to call for a consultation or to make an appointment, please don't hesitate to reach out to my office as I'm always here to help you and your family. My number is 256-543-7879.
Free Consultation: 256-543-7879.
Experience
Owner and Attorney at Law
Morgan Law Firm
2002-Present
Gadsden, AL
Attorney
Burns, Burns, Burns, and Morgan
1992-2002
Gadsden, AL
Attorney
Inzer, Suttle, Swann & Stivender
1989-1992
Gadsden, AL
Admission
AL
1989
Education
Jacksonville State University
B.S. (Microbiology)
1984


Recognitions & Achievements
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Alabama Bar Association, Member of the National Registry of Who's Who
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Honored member of the international Executive Guild
Notable Work
Liggans RV Center v. JOHN DEERE INS., 575 So. 2d 567 (Ala. 1991).
The unambiguous policy language makes a clear distinction between "theft" (a covered loss) and "false pretenses" (a non-covered loss), and the facts of the instant case fall squarely within the latter definition. There is no need to refer to statutory criminal definitions to determine that the loss of the Allegro motor home by Liggans due to the "trick, scheme, or false pretenses" of the unidentified couple is excluded by the terms of the policy. The trial court correctly held that John Deere had no obligation to pay the claim for that loss.
King v. WA Brown & Sons, Inc., 585 So. 2d 10 (Ala. 1991).
Likewise, we note that the slippery nature of a floor is not a subject that is necessarily within the exclusive knowledge of experts. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham v. Lowery, 263 Ala. 36, 81 So.2d 284 (1955). In light of these facts, we find that the trial court did not err in refusing the Kings' requested jury charge. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
McCallie v. McCallie, 660 So. 2d 584 (Ala. 1995).
Finally, we do agree with Jackie's contention that there is no apparent basis for the award of an attorney fee. Alabama follows the American rule, by which attorney fees may be recovered if they are provided by statute, if they are provided by contract, or if they are available by special equity, such as in proceedings where the attorney's efforts create a "common fund" out of which fees may be paid.
Garrett v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 584 So. 2d 1327 (Ala. 1991).
Besides holding that the Alfa farmowner's policy did not provide coverage under these facts, the trial court also held that the Garretts were entitled to summary judgment in their favor on the question of whether there was coverage under their respective automobile policies. Harbin Garrett is insured under two automobile policies owned by him. Tony Garrett is insured under a policy which he purchased to cover his automobile. Tony Garrett is also an insured, because he is a family member living in the same household as his father, Harbin Garrett, under Harbin Garrett's automobile policies. We affirm the judgment of the trial court with regard to coverage under the automobile policies. The summary judgment is affirmed insofar as it determined that the Garretts had coverage under their automobile policies. The judgment is reversed insofar as it holds that the Garretts had no coverage under the farmowner's policy, and the cause remanded.
Johnson v. Fambrough, 706 So. 2d 739 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
After reviewing all the testimony in a light most favorable to the employee, we conclude that the employee apparently did suffer some distress. However, we conclude that the employee's distress was not so "severe" as to support recovery for the tort of outrage.