New Notice of Claim Provisions in New York State regarding Individual Employees
Accident & Injury Personal Injury
Summary: A Recent Look at a Change of Law in New York State regarding the need to name Individual Employees in a notice of Claim, and the ramifications of the New Rule.
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Plain Language of
New York Municipal Law 50-e Does Not Require Plaintiff to Include Names of
Individual Defendant-Doctors in Medical Malpractice Notice of Claim.
In this action
arising out of alleged medical malpractice by a defendant public services
medical center and its physician employees, the Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, traces back the line of reasoning to the holding in White v. Averill Park Central School
District, 195 Misc2d 409 [Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 2003]) and finds no
legal authority for that holding.
In May 2009,
decedent sought treatment at Erie County Medical Center, a public services
corporation. She was admitted on May 9, 200i9, and discharged on May 12, 2009.
Five days later, decedent was transported back to the medical center by
ambulance and she died the next day. In August 2009, plaintiff served a notice
of claim on the medical center, naming the medical center as the sole
defendant. Thereafter, plaintiff commenced this action against five
individually named doctors (the Employee Defendants), as well as the medical
center. Defendants thereafter moved to dismiss the complaint against the
Employee Defendants on the grounds that they were neither served nor named in
the notice of claim. (see generally General Municipal Law section 50-e). The
motion court denied the motion, and for the reasons stated below, the Appellate
Division, Fourth Department, affirmed.
Section 50-e of
the General Municipal Law does not require service of notice of claim on the
Employee Defendants as a condition precedent to the commencement of this
action.
It is undisputed
that the plaintiff served the notice of claim on the medical center in
accordance with the provisions of section 50-e(1)(b). Inasmuch as the statute
unambiguously states that service upon employees of the medical center, i.e.,
the Employee Defendants, is not a condition precedent to the commencement of an
action against the individual employees, there is no merit to defendants’
initial contention on their motion that the failure to serve the Employee
Defendants with the notice of claim requires dismissal of the complaint against
them. Thus, the Court notes, to the extent that the Court’s prior decision in Rew v. County of Niagara, 73 AD3d 1463
(2010), suggests that service of a notice of claim upon an employee of a public
corporation is a condition precedent to commencement of the action against such
employee, that decision is no longer to be followed.
The defendants
also contend that, although service of the notice of claim on the Employee
Defendants was not required, plaintiff was required to name those individual
defendants in the noticed of claim as a condition precedent to the commencement
of an action against them. Despite precedent supporting that contention, the
Court agrees with the motion court that there is no such requirement.
The notice of
claim filed by the plaintiff against the medical center contained all of the
required information. Defendants contend, however, that precedent from the
Fourth Department and others requires that all of the Employee Defendants also
be named in the notice of claim. While recognizing the importance of stare
decisis, the Court concluded that its prior cases were wrongly decided.
In both Rew and Cropsey v. County of Orleans Industrial Development Agency, 66 AD3d
1361 (2009), this Court wrote that General Municipal Law section 50-e bars the
commencement of an action against an individual who has not been named in the
notice of claim where such notice is required by law. The decision in Rew cited on Cropsey for that proposition, and the decision in Cropsey cited only Tannenbaum v. City of New York (30 AD3d 357 [2006]), in support of
its statement to the same effect. In deciding Tannenbaum, the First Department cited on White v. Averill in support
of its statement that section 50-e makes unauthorized an action against
individuals who have not been named in a notice of claim.
The Court can
find no cases before White with such
a holding. The decision in White is
devoid of legal authority supporting the justices’ view that individual
employees must be named in a notice of claim as a condition precedent to the
commencement of an action against them. The justice who authored the White decision concluded that, without
naming the individual employees, the municipality does not have enough
information to enable it to investigate the claim. He thus concluded that permitting plaintiffs
to prosecute causes of action against individuals who were not named in the
notice of claim is contrary both to the law and the purpose of General
Municipal Law section 50-e.
While the First
Department in its decision in White cited to Ratner v. Planning Commission of Village of Pleasantville, 156 AD2d
521 [1989], that case does not stand for the proposition that individual
employees must be named in a notice of claim. The issue in Ratner was whether a notice of claim, to be served on the public
corporation, was required at all, not whether the notice of claim needed to
name the specific individual employees.
There is no doubt
that, despite the absence of any statutory provision so holding, numerous cases
have held that, where a notice of claim is required by law, a plaintiff must,
as a condition precedent to the commencement of an action against the
individual employees of a public corporation name those employees in the notice
of claim. In support of her position that individual employees need not be
named in a notice of claim, the plaintiff notes the absence of any such
requirement within the statute and quotes Schiavone
v. County of Nassau, 51 AD2d 980 (1976) for the proposition that, on a
purely practical basis, it is obvious that, uniquely in medical malpractice
actions, a potential claimant may not be able to ascertain the perpetrators to
the alleged malpractice within the 90-day notice period.
The question for
this Court is whether it should follow its prior decisions, based on the
doctrine of stare decisis. The Court concludes that the courts have misapplied
or misunderstood the law creating, by judicial fiat, a requirement for notice
of claim that goes beyond those requirements set forth in the statute. If the
legislature had intended that there be a requirement that the individual
employees be named in notices of claim, it could have easily created such a
requirement.