Student's Imminent Injury Sparks Exception to School Immunity
by
Joseph C. Maya on Apr. 07, 2017
Other Education Criminal Juvenile Law Accident & Injury Personal Injury
Summary: Blog post on a case involving an injury at a public school and the issue of who constitutes "imminent harm" under Connecticut law.
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"Imminent harm excludes risks which might occur, if at all, at some unspecified time in the future," pursuant to Superior Court Judge A. Susan Peck's 2006 decision, Cady v. Tolland. Allegedly, the defendant, Matthew McCluster, tripped the minor plaintiff, Andrew Rigoli, at Shelton Intermediate School, and Rigoli suffered serious and permanent injuries to his knee. The plaintiff sued McCluster, the municipality and the board of education, alleging that the defendants failed to follow anti-bullying procedures and to keep the students away from each other.
The board moved for summary judgment and argued it was entitled to immunity, pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes §52-557n. An exception to immunity exists if the plaintiff proves: 1.) an imminent harm; 2.) an identifiable victim; and 3.) a public official to whom it is apparent that his or her conduct is likely to subject the identifiable victim to imminent harm. Rigoli, as a student who attended a public school, qualified as an "identifiable victim." The defendant board of education argued that he did not qualify as an identifiable victim subject to "imminent harm," because McCluster could have tripped Rigoli at any time during the day. "[D]ecisions of the Superior Court addressing the imminent harm requirement in the context of students injured at school during school hours have overwhelmingly denied summary judgment . . . [when issues of fact exist concerning] the duration, geographic scope, significance and foreseeability of the risk of harm," pursuant to Superior Court Judge Robin Wilson's 2010 decision, Bergers v. Board of Education. Here, a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether Rigoli was subjected to "imminent harm," and the court denied the board's motion for summary judgment.
If you have a child with a disability and have questions about special education law, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq., at 203-221-3100, or at JMaya@mayalaw.com, to schedule a free consultation.
Source: J.Hiller, Genuine Issue Whether Student Was Subject To Imminent Harm, 38 CONN LAW TRIB 8 at 18 (Feb. 20, 2012)